affected only those Vietnam-era veterans with "boots-on-the-ground" (BOG) in Vietnam or surrounding countries; they find that DC enrollment subsequently surged and labor force participation fell among BOG veterans relative to their non-BOG counterparts. Further research on the DC program, especially work that includes veterans serving since the Vietnam era, is clearly warranted, given the program's size. The DC program is roughly 40 percent as large as the SSDI program in both beneficiaries and expenditures, though only one-tenth of the adult population is potentially eligible for DC benefits.
In this paper, we explore trends over time in the labor force participation of veterans as compared to non-veterans, investigating whether there are patterns that may be consistent with an increasingly important role for the DC program. We also examine whether veterans are more responsive to economic shocks than non-veterans, and whether this relationship has strengthened as the DC program has grown. To conduct this analysis, we estimate labor force participation regressions using 35 years of data from the March CPS. We have two primary findings. First, we find that the labor force participation of veterans has been declining over time in a way that coincides closely with the growth of the DC program. Second, we find that veterans were more sensitive to economic shocks than non-veterans in recent years, when the DC program was growing rapidly, but were not more sensitive in an earlier period when enrollments were lower and relatively stable.
I. The DC Program: Background and Trends
Any honorably discharged veteran may apply for DC benefits.
A Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) rating board evaluates whether the veteran's claimed disabilities are service-connected, and if it determines that they are, rates their severity in 10 percentage point increments from 10% to 100%. The DC benefit amount is an increasing function of the recipient's combined disability rating (CDR), which is an increasing function of the severity ratings for different conditions, with higher values reflecting more severe disability. In 2014, monthly benefits ranged from $131 for a CDR of 10% to $2,858 per month for a CDR of 100%.
Benefits are tax-free and continue until death. DC beneficiaries are not prohibited from working and may collect other disability benefits, such as SSDI, simultaneously with the DC benefit.
1
The DC program is a potentially compelling candidate to explain declining labor force participation among veterans because it has grown rapidly in recent years, as shown in Figure 1 . for veterans who served in the "Vietnam theater" during the war, starting in 2001. As Duggan et. al. (2010) show, DC enrollment subsequently increased much more rapidly for Vietnam-era veterans than for veterans who served after that war. In 2010, the VA added ischemic heart disease, Parkinson's disease, and B-cell leukemia to the set of service-connected conditions for
Vietnam veterans who served in theater.
1 About 8 percent of DC recipients receive enhanced benefits through "individual unemployability." For this group, significant earnings would likely cause them to lose their IU designation veterans to apply early for DC benefits in the two months before discharge (whereas previously the requirement was at least 60 days in advance).
The rapid rise in DC enrollment also coincided with a substantial increase in the average, inflation-adjusted monthly DC benefit. As 
II. Analysis Using the Current Population Survey
The discussion above suggests that the growth of the DC program may have contributed to a decline in veteran's labor supply over time. We begin our analysis by simply looking at how the labor supply of veterans has compared to that of non-veterans over time. As most veterans are male, we restrict our analysis to men. To explore this and subsequent questions, we use data from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the calendar years 1980 through 2014. The March CPS has a number of advantages for our approach. First, the sample size is large enough that we will have a significant number of veterans in the sample, even when we estimate models separately for five-year periods, as described below. It is available over a long time period, spanning both the period of rapid DC program growth (2002 to present) and an earlier period when enrollments were fairly stable. Finally, for our analysis exploring responsiveness to economic conditions, the availability of state and county-level geographic identifiers is useful, as the data may be linked to unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
For our first analysis, we estimate straightforward linear probability models of the form: In the first period, 1980-1984, the labor force participation rate of veterans is 0.97 percentage points higher than that of non-veterans, controlling for any potential differences in the age and racial composition of the veteran and non-veteran populations. We have not controlled for potential differences in education or health, a subject to which we return below. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as are all of the coefficients displayed on the table. In the following three time periods, 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-99 This relative decline in veteran's labor force participation coincides with the rapid growth in the DC program. As shown on Table 1 , the share of veterans in the March CPS sample reporting that they receive DC income rises from 5.4 percent in 1990-94 to 12.9% in 2010-2014 (data for earlier periods is not available due to changes in variable definitions over time). While these figures are somewhat lower than the DC participation rates from administrative data reported above, as might be expected since underreporting of government transfer income in survey data is common (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008) , the trends in both are very similar.
Yet we must be cautious in inferring too much from these results, as other factors in the post-2000 period might also have contributed to these findings. To probe this question further,
in Table 2 we report the results of estimating these models separately for four age groups, 25-34, 35-54, 55-64, and 65-74 (the latter group was not included in the Table 1 
results). The results
are somewhat noisier, as sample sizes are smaller than in Table 1 , but interesting patterns emerge nonetheless.
In the age 55-64 group, veterans are roughly equally likely to be in the labor force as non- Easier access to the DC program may lead to reduced labor force participation, as we believe is suggested by the results in Tables 1 and 2 . But this access may have more subtle effects as well. In the case of SSDI, Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate that the easier access to benefits that followed a 1984 policy change may have made low-skilled workers who lost a job more likely to respond by exiting the labor force and applying for DI. The liberalization of medical eligibility for DC benefits may have had a similar effect, leading the employment of veterans to become more sensitive to economic conditions relative to that of non-veterans.
We explore this hypothesis by estimating regression models of the following form:
This is similar to earlier models, where the subscript s now refers to state, but adds state by year indicators as well as an interaction term between the state-level unemployment rate (lagged by one year and de-meaned) and the veteran dummy. The main effect of unemployment on labor force participation is absorbed in the state by year dummies. One key difference from earlier models is that we now have only two time periods, 1989-2001 and 2002-2014 , corresponding to periods of relative stability and growth for the DC program. For the 2002-2014 period, we estimate a version of the model using the country-level unemployment rate (and county by year dummies), which may correspond more closely to local economic conditions, but we are unable to do so for 1989-2001 due to a lack of county identifiers in the March CPS prior to 1996.
The results of this exercise are shown on Table 3 . In the earlier time period, there is no evidence that veterans are more responsive to economic shocks than non-veterans; if anything, they are less responsive, as coefficient on the interaction term is positive and marginally significant for the full sample (age 25-64), though small, at 0.2 points. By contrast, in the later period we find that that the labor force participation of veterans is more cyclically sensitive than that of non-veterans. For the sample as a whole, a one point increase in the unemployment rate lowers labor force participation by 0.4 to 0.5 points more for veterans than for non-veterans. But the effect is much larger for veterans age 25-34 and for veterans 55-64, at 0.8 to 1.0 points.
While this is admittedly an indirect test of the effect of the DC program on labor force participation, the fact that veterans' greater cyclically sensitivity emerges only in 2002-2014 as DC eligibility is being liberalized, and that the effect is particularly strong for the age groups that include the GWOT and Vietnam veterans affected by liberalization, suggests that providing easier access to benefits may have affected labor force participation by allowing veterans to respond to economic shocks by withdrawing from the labor market.
III. Discussion and Conclusions
Our results document that the labor force participation of male veterans has fallen over time relative to that of their non-veteran counterparts, by about 5 percentage points since the late 1990s. We provide suggestive evidence that the striking growth in the DC program since 2001 may help to explain this trend, as the timing of the decline lines up well with the growth of the DC program, especially when looking at specific age groups. Our finding that the labor force participation of veterans has become more cyclically sensitive since DC enrollments began to rise sharply is further suggestive of a labor supply effect of the DC program.
To explore what our results might imply about the employment potential of the marginal DC recipient, we conduct the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. We estimate that the (relative) labor force participation rate of veterans has fallen by 5 percentage points over the past fifteen years, while the share of veterans receiving DC benefits has risen by 9 percentage points.
Under the strong, and perhaps unlikely, assumption that liberalized DC enrollment is the only factor driving the drop in veterans' labor force participation, this would imply that something (2013) and French and Song (2014) , who estimate that about 28 percent of marginal SSDI recipients could have worked, for the DC program, whose estimate based on the liberalization of DC benefits for BOG Vietnam veterans is 18 percent. But the effect may be higher in our case because the average inflation-adjusted benefits have also grown during this period due to the increase in the average CDR.
As noted in the introduction, there are other factors that may have contributed to the decline in veterans' labor force participation over time, and these factors merit further research. 
